empirical findings on the democracy-growth nexus are divided at best (Barro, 1997; Petrova & Bates, 2007; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000; Gerring, Bond, Barndt, & Moreno, 2005).
Barro, R. (1997). Determinants of economic growth: A cross-country
empirical study. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J., & Limongi, F. (2000).
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-
Being in the World 1950–1990. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
Those interested in the rule of law more narrowly conceived have focused on more discrete institutional checks that might enhance the credibility of commitments (Cox & McCubbins, 2001; Tsebelis, 2002) including those arising from constitutional arrangements (presidentialism and
bicameralism), electoral rules (proportional representation and the corresponding likelihood of coalition governments), the so-called “horizontal” checks on government, such as independent
central banks or regulatory agencies (Schedler, Diamond, & Plattner, 1999) and from independent judiciaries.
The most comprehensive effort to construct a cross-national database of institutional checks on government has been undertaken by Henisz, who finds a relationship between such checks
and economic growth (Henisz, 2000a), the volatility of policy (Henisz, 2004), foreign direct investment (Henisz, 2000b), and investment in infrastructure (Henisz, 2002) and telecommunications
(Henisz & Zelner, 2001; see also Stasavage, 2002, 2003).
Henisz, W. J. (2000b). The institutional environment for multinational
investment. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 16(2),
Henisz, W. J. (2002). The institutional environment for infrastructure
investment. Industrial and Corporate Change, 11(2), 355–389.
Henisz, W. J., & Zelner, B. A. (2001). The institutional environment for
telecommunications investment. Journal of Economic Management
Strategy, 10(1), 123–148.
Stasavage, D. (2002). Private investment and political institutions.
Economic Politics, 14, 41–63.
Stasavage, D. (2003). Public debt and the birth of the democratic state:
France and Britain. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.