Sunday, April 02, 2017

Taiwan, China, One China principle/consensus/policy

  • the wake of the break-up of 1949, the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China enforced a ban on mutual trade. KEMPF, D., & DESBUISSONS, F. (1996)
  • in 1978, that the PRC sought to improve relations with its neighbour in the context of domestic economic reform. The aforementioned “united front" strategy officially consisted of seeking to improve political relations through economic integration. The Taiwanese responded with the triple “no" policy, which was articulated in 1985: no contacts, no negotiations, no compromise. In this way, cross strait economic relations were defined negatively by the necessity for indirect contacts KEMPF, D., & DESBUISSONS, F. (1996)
  • in November 1987, when individuals were allowed to travel to the PRC for “family” reasons, a policy which businessmen were quick to exploit for market exploration trips. The following year, permission to travel was extended to low-ranking officials. Also in 1988, Taiwan changed its rules and gave official caution to indirect trade by authorising imports of a small num ber of products from mainland China. Investment in the mainland was subjected to stringent conditions KEMPF, D., & DESBUISSONS, F. (1996)
  • In November 1987, the Taiwan government moved to allow Taiwan citizens to visit relatives on the mainland. 
  • in 1987, the mainland government adopted "Regulations Governing Investment Incentives for Taiwanese Brethren" which guaranteed equal treatment for Taiwanese citizens and foreigners, and included specific clauses favourable to Taiwanese ventures (such as tax exemptions or land management advantages). In effect, each province was left free to implement specific policies to attract Taiwanese investments KEMPF, D., & DESBUISSONS, F. (1996)
  • In 1990, Taiwan officially authorised business trips to China and allowed the import of a wider range of products   KEMPF, D., & DESBUISSONS, F. (1996)
  • In 1991 the Straits Exchange Foundation and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait mechanisms were established in Taipei and Beijing, respectively. 
  • In 1992 Beijing announced the “Statute Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area,” which was followed a year later with the enactment of “Guidelines Governing the Entry of People of the Taiwan Area into the Mainland Area.”
  • Koo-Wang talks of 1993.
  • Guidelines covering traffic in the reverse direction were issued in 1993 as well, although Taiwan retained restrictions about who was allowed to come from the mainland. These two sets of legislation from Taipei and Beijing greatly facilitated the travel of people across the Strait, primarily from Taiwan to the mainland. Furthermore, although these mechanisms were created in response to the growing reality of Taiwan citizens wishing to and actually already making trips to the PRC, creating the mechanisms also boosted confidence. Combined with the business upturn in China in the early 1990s, they helped to dramatically boost the volume of people traveling from Taiwan to the mainland. Sutter, K. M. (2002). Business Dynamism across the Taiwan Strait: The Implications for Cross-Strait Relations. Asian Survey, 42(3), 522-540
  • There was no further change in the regulatory framework until 1996 KEMPF, D., & DESBUISSONS, F. (1996)


In 1885 the Qing government declared Taiwan a province and appointedLiu Mingchuan its first provincial governor (xunfu). Liu was assigned a difficult mission: to modernize the island and make it a blockhouse against foreign incursion of China. However, Taiwan, as a frontier settlement for poor Chinese immigrants, had been tossed aside by Chinese governments for centuries.For much of the Qing period, the island was governed by absentee Mandarins based primarily in Fujian,who spent little time on the island and regarded Taiwan as a chaotic and plague-ridden periphery. Chu, Y.-h., & Lin, J.-w. (2001).

Thus depreciated, Taiwan was ceded to Japan through the Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895 after the Sino-Japanese war. The Japanese took over Liu’s truncated business of modernization, but within a very different political framework. The challenge faced by the Japanese was twofold. On the one hand, armed resistance must be crushed for the colonial government to be installable. On the other, incorporating some 2.5 million Chinese immigrants politically, economically and culturally
into the emerging Japanese imperium remained a daunting task. Chu, Y.-h., & Lin, J.-w. (2001).

The occupation of Taiwan was dominated by political and military considerations, under which the Taiwanese were treated as potential challengers rather than as equal citizens. In addition, the Japanese did not find Taiwan’s climatic and sanitarian environments favourable to large-scale emigration. With a handful of colonizers clustering in the cities, the assimilation policy was simply unrealistic. Chu, Y.-h., & Lin, J.-w. (2001).

the Taiwanese are biologically distinguishable from the Japanese, and must be governed according to local conditions. Under this policy, extensive surveys were conducted between 1898 and 1903 on Taiwan’s geography, land, traditional customs and population. These investigations helped the colonial government to usurp unclaimed properties, reassign land ownership, implement tax reform, monopolize key industries and reach financial independence. the colonial government kept Taiwan’s social structure intact, but subjected it to close surveillance. With an extensively built police
network that was fused with the traditional baojia system, the government infiltrated every corner of Taiwanese society. Chu, Y.-h., & Lin, J.-w. (2001).

Taiwanese residents were allowed to choose nationality in the first two years of occupation. Only a few thousand left for China, and the remainder became Japanese subjects. Even so, the Taiwanese far from enjoyed complete Japanese citizenship. They were excluded from the government and representative bodies, did not even hold partial suffrage, were vulnerable to police abuse, and had no right to serve in the military. Chu, Y.-h., & Lin, J.-w. (2001).

The Nationalist government launched its military conscription in Taiwan as early as 1951,

power transferred from Chiang Kai-shek to his oldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, in the late 1960s, without the historical stature of his father and foreseeing the legitimacy crisis of the regime, Chiang tried to broaden his social support by recruiting more native Taiwanese to the party and state leadership;  nominate Lee Teng-hui, a native, as the vice-president and his official successor in
March 1984. His decision to tolerate the forming of the DPP in 1986 and the subsequent announcement, only a week after the birth of the DPP, of his intention to lift martial law and many long-time political bans, were a watershed in Taiwan’s regime transition. Chu, Y.-h., & Lin, J.-w. (2001)

Chiang Ching-kuo implemented the "Taiwanization" policy in 1972. Thereafter, the number of Taiwanese in the state apparatus expanded steadily, (Wong, 2005)

With the indigenization of the KMT power structure, the state was eventually converted from a cultural agent of Chinese nationalism into an incubator of a “re-imaged community” based on a new Taiwanese identity. Chu, Y.-h., & Lin, J.-w. (2001). Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity. The China Quarterly, 165, 102-129

Chiang Ching-kuo choose two Taiwanese as vice presidents of the ROC, Shieh Tung-min in 1978 and Lee Teng-hui in 1984.

Taiwan firms were officially prohibited from directly trading with or investing in the PRC under Chiang Ching-Kuo’s “three no’s policy” of 1979 (no contact, no negotiation, no compromise) Sutter, K. M. (2002).

In 1983 Beijing enacted the “Guidance on Taiwanese Investments in Special Economic Zones and Related Favorable Policies.” The PRC’s State Council moved to offer further incentives and a legal foundation for Taiwan investment  in July 1988 with the issuance of “Regulations for Encouraging Investment by Taiwan Compatriots,” which was followed in May 1989 by the establishment of two investment zones for Taiwan firms in Xiamen and Fuzhou cities, both in Fujian Province. And in 1994 the National People’s Congress passed legislation protecting investment by Taiwan firms.K. M. (2002).

Before the mid-1980s, interaction with the PRC was anathema to the leaders, since it violated the official "three no's" policy of "no contact, no negotiation, and no compro- mise" that was first introduced by Chiang Kai-shek and later reiterated by his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, in 1982. Even after this policy was abolished in 1987,1987, Lee Teng-hui remained lukewarm toward cross-Strait ties, reasoning that they would complicate Taipei's political autonomy; Leng, "A Political Analysis of Taiwan s Economic Dependence on Main- land China," p. 134

Since the mid-1980s, companies have circumvented the government's ban on cross-Strait contact by conducting their operations through third destinations and by underreporting trade and investment figures.figures. When the government realized that these activities could no longer be suppressed, it relaxed the existing restrictions and promulgated new laws, hop- ing that the updated policy would help limit cross-Strait ties. (Wong, 2005)

passing Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988 hastened the breakdown of the one-party authoritarian rule. The built-in succession mechanism put Lee Teng-hui in charge of political reform. --- accelerated the trend of Taiwanization,  Chu, Y.-h., & Lin, J.-w. (2001)

In the first place, it was economic and social pressures that forced Taipei to loosen its decades-old restrictions on mainland contact in the late-1980s. (Wong, 2005)

In October 1990, the Taipei government issued “Regulations on Indirect Investment or Technical Cooperation in the Mainland Area.” This was Taiwan’s first regulation to deal directly with the issue of Taiwan investment in the PRC. The new measures allowed Taiwan firms to invest in 3,353 products, mostly in labor-intensive industries such as apparel, footwear, household electronics, and food processing. K. M. (2002).

By the mid-1990s, Taiwanese firms began to shift from labor-intensive and low-value manufacturing to more capital- and technology-intensive investments such as computers and petrochemicals. K. M. (2002).

Regulations Governing Permission of Trade Between the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, which were promulgated in April 1993 and amended in October 1996 by MOEA.Sutter, K. M. (2002).

Taiwan's economic policy toward China before 1996 was truly market-conforming. Taiwanese government had some regulations on trade with and investment in China, but none seems to be outright contradictory with market forces then prevailing. But as 1996 went on, Taiwan's economic policy toward China became more and more market-non-confirming, culminating in President Lee's call for "No Haste, Be Patient" toward the Chinese market in September 1996. Ho, S. Y., & Leng *, T. K. (2004).

Ho, S. Y., & Leng *, T. K. (2004). Accounting for Taiwan's economic policy toward China. Journal of Contemporary China, 13(41), 733-746.

Taipei adopted this new approach, known as tanxing waijiao (elastic diplomacy) in the early 1990s by abandoning its insistence on being the only legitimate Chinese government in the international arena. This new policy was elaborated in Taipei's first foreign affairs report in January 1993, which called for an expansion of international links without regard for the reactions of mainland China. In addition, Taipei's White Paper on Cross-Strait Relations of July 1994 stated that Taipei would "no longer compete with Beijing for the right to represent China in the international arena. Zhao, S. (1999). 

President Lee Teng-hui (1996-

The term “1992 consensus” was invented by Su Chi, who served as the former Mainland
Affairs Council Chairman in the Lee Teng-hui administration

emergence of Taiwanese nationalism throughout the rest of Lee Teng-hui's tenure, (Wong, 2005)

The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis--military exercises aimed at Taiwan from July 1995 to March 1996.
A 1995 visit by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to his American alma mater, Cornell University, provoked China to conduct military exercises and fire missiles near Taiwan.In March
1996, the PRC launched more missiles near Taiwan; O'Hanlon, M. (2000). Whiting, A. S. (2001)
Taiwan first popular presidential election in March 1996 ( Lee Teng-hui). Months before the election, China launched missiles into the water surrounding Taiwan. Ho, S. Y., & Leng *, T. K. (2004)

Beijing declared its successful conclusion of military exercises following Lee Teng-hui's re-election as Taiwan's president in March 1996. Prior to the March 1996 presidential election, Beijing launched missile tests in the Taiwan Strait.

Beijing became angered particularly by Lee's interview with Japanese writer Ryotaro Shiba in March 1994 and Lee's visit to the U.S. in May 1995. In his interview with Shiba, Lee talked about "the sorrow of being a Taiwanese," and compared himself to Moses, saying that he would lead his followers to escape from Egypt, cross the Red Sea and build another country in another place.
Beijing saw Lee's U.S. visit as opening the prelude to the "Exodus" and moving China's "family affairs" into the international arena.

Beijing concluded that Lee would brazenly campaign for Taiwan independence after becoming the first directly elected president in Taiwan in March 1996, so the mainland must make preparations for this possibility. Beijing could no longer show tolerance toward Lee's visit to the U.S. to create two Chinas

President Lee Teng-hui’s attempt to divert investment away from mainland China toward Southeast Asia in 1993 with his “Go South” policy failed to divert enthusiasm significantly from business opportunities in the PRC. K. M. (2002).

“patience over haste” policy of 1996 was advocated by then-President Lee Teng-hui to slow down the capital flow from Taiwan to China and capped Taiwanese investment on the mainland to, at one point, 40% of a company’s total assets.Ho, S. Y., & Leng *, T. K. (2004)

Taipei in August 1996 to enact the “Be Patient, Go Slow” policy K. M. (2002).

In 1996, at the apex of his career, Lee Teng-hui announced his plan to curb cross-Strait commerce. Arguably the most resolute measure since exchanges with the mainland commenced in the 1980s, the "Go Slow, Be Patient" policy included a wide range of legal restrictions.

China responded with moderation to Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory” issued in mid-1999, in an
attempt to stabilize cross-strait relations and thus maintain concentration on addressing
internal problems. Tung, C.-y. (2005).

Lee Teng-hui's six-point response to Jiang's eight-point proposal further disappointed Beijing because Lee required the mainland to acknowledge "the reality of divided rule between Taiwan and the mainland." In Beijing's view, "this is actually asking the mainland to recognize two Chinas first and then discuss the issue of the reunification." Lee also demanded that Beijing give up the resort to force against Taiwan as a prerequisite for talks between the two sides. In Beijing's view, this "reversed the order of cross-strait negotiations and the ending of the state of hostility between the two sides" and "can only encourage Taiwan independence. " Zhao, S. (1999). Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing's Strategy of National Reunification with Taiwan. Pacific Affairs, 72(4), 495-512

President Chen Shui-bian (2000–08)

opposition movement beginning in the 1970s, used support for independence as a means of challenging the KMT and promoting democratization. Saunders, P. C. (2005)

Founded in 1986, the DPP expanded rapidly from a group of loosely organized dissidents - the dangwai movement - to Taiwan's ruling party in less than two and a half decades

After nearly four decades of authoritarian rule by the KMT, democratic forces began to gain ground in Taiwan in the mid-1980s. As a result, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was legally established on 28 September 1986 and openly called for Taiwan independence.

Prior to the presidential election, Beijing had hinted several times that if Chen were elected, Beijing might use military force against Taiwan.After the election, however, Beijing did not adopt a harsh response, but instead followed a low-keyed “listen to what he says, and watch what he does” approach toward the new Taiwanese president. Then Chinese President Jiang Zemin openly took the stance that China could not afford to use military force against Taiwan because such action could jeopardize China’s economic development. Tung, C.-y. (2005). An Assessment of China's Taiwan Policy under the Third Generation Leadership. Asian Survey, 45(3), 343-361.

three days before the Mar. 18, 2000 presidential elections, the then P.R.C. Premier Zhu Rongji waved his fists on TV warning Taiwanese voters not to support the DPP candidate or the consequences could be disastrous.

Chen’s May 2000 inaugural speech included five specific pledges intended to reassure China, the so-called “four nos and one will not.” Chen declared that “as long as the CCP [Chinese Communisty Party] regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan,” he would not declare independence, change the national title from the Republic of China, push for inclusion of “special state to state” relations in the Constitution, promote a referendum on the question of independence or unification, or abolish the National Reunification Council. Chen referred to these commitments again in his 2004 inaugural address. This conditional pledge of restraint was intended to reassure China but has had limited success. Chinese analysts see a pattern of continuing steps toward independence,
ranging from small moves such as adding the word “Taiwan” to Republic of China passports to more significant actions such as the passage of legislation authorizing referendums (which might eventually be used for a referendum on independence) and Chen’s push for creation of a new Constitution. Saunders, P. C. (2005). Long-term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: Implications for U.S. Taiwan Policy. Asian Survey, 45(6), 970-991.

Chen administration announced in September 2000 and implemented in January 2001 the "mini three links" - the lifting of bans on travel and trade between mainland China and nearby offshore islands that have been under Taipei's jurisdiction. But these links simply "legalized the 'unofficial trade' that had been going on for years. Thomas J. Bellows, "Cross Straits Relations and the Chen Shui-bian Administration," Asian Journal of Political Science, vol. 9, No. 1 (June, 2001), p. 67

December 31, 2000, Chen proposed an “integration theory”: future political integration through economic and cultural integration. This was a significant breakthrough in the DPP’s China policy because in the past, the DPP had never discussed or proposed any possibility of political integration between Taiwan and China. However, on March 19, 2001, Chen told leaders of the World Taiwanese Congress that the term “integration” referred mainly to a process for cross-strait rapprochement
and would not necessarily lead to unification. Tung, C.-y. (2005).

In August 2001, Taiwan President Chen Shuibian’s newly formed Economic Development Advisory Council (EDAC) agreed on a range of economic recommendations, including the liberalization
of direct trade and investment, the creation of more flexible cross-Strait capital flow mechanisms, and the opening of travel and tourism. Sutter, K. M. (2002)

In september 2001, replace No Haste, Be Patient with "Active Opening, Effective Regulation"
but many had already invested in Chinese market, disregarding government regulations, Ho, S. Y., & Leng *, T. K. (2004)

Chen made his greatest concession in August 2001 by announcing his plan to lift the "Go Slow, Be Patient" policy and resume cross- Strait talk  (Wong, 2005)

Chen’s “one-country-on-each-side theory” was issued on August 3, 2002. --- China thereafter portrayed him as a “stubborn” supporter of Taiwan independence. Consequently,Beijing has not responded positively or promptly to Chen’s initiatives on cross-strait relations.Tung, C.-y. (2005).

Beijing believes that the worst period of cross-strait relations (when “one-country-on-each-side theory” was issued in August 2002) Tung, C.-y. (2005).

When Chen Shui-bian’s “one-country-on-each-side theory” was issued in August 2002, China’s reaction was very low-key, because military intimidation would have been harmful to Sino-U.S. relations and the feelings of the Taiwanese people, and even more detrimental to China’s economic
development. Tung, C.-y. (2005).

pro-identity politics and nationalist agenda

In 2003, Taiwan’s then-President Chen Shui-bian and his predecessor Lee Teng-hui claimed that they would push for a new constitution in 2006 through a referendum, with plans to implement it in 2008 before the Summer Olympics in Beijing. Hu viewed these remarks as a menacing taidu timetable forcing Beijing to act, and it seemed the years leading to 2008 could have been the most dangerous time China’s current leaders had faced up to that point.

Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship: The United States,
Taiwan, and the Taiwan Relations Act,” China Quarterly 165 (2001), pp. 147–72; Donald S. Zagoria,
ed., Breaking the China-Taiwan Impasse (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003); Mathieu Duchâtel, “Taiwan: The Security Policy of the Chen Government since 2000,” China Perspectives 64 (March-April 2006), pp. 45–57; and Philip Yang, “Doubly Dualistic Dilemma: U.S. Strategies toward China and Taiwan,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 6:2 (2006), pp. 209–25.

China neither resorted to military intimidation nor verbal attacks during the March 2004 presidential election

President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-

For years,President Ma has emphasised that his cross-strait policy is based on the principle of “No Reunification, No Independence and No War.”

Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, KMT).
The new administration of President Ma Ying-jeou is firmly dedicated to the promotion of increased interaction and economic integration across the Taiwan Strait, in the hope that this will lead to political rapprochement and, eventually, a peace agreement between Taipei and Beijing.

Taiwan and mainland China signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in June 2010, an agreement that aims to reduce trade barriers between mainland China and Taiwan.

President Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected president of Taiwan on 14 February 2012.


Mao Zedong, clear his intentions to "liberate" Taiwan and defeat the Nationalist (Guomintang) forces based there. China postponed its preparations to the island after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, when Harry Truman deployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan which runs between the mainland and Taiwan. Hostilities between China and the Nationalists resumed in 1952 in battles over control of the coastal islands adjacent to Zhejiang and Fujian Provinces, some of which the Nationalists used as bases for raids on the mainland; Fravel, M. T. (2008).

The first major crisis over Taiwan erupted on September 3, 1954, when the PLA began a punishing shelling of Jinmen (Kinmen) Island  ; On August 23, 1958, PLA forces initiated a second crisis across Strait with another sustained shelling of Jinmen; Fravel, M. T. (2008).

Beijing's taking over of Taipei's seat in the UN General Assembly and Security Council in 1971.

switching of diplomatic recognition of the United States from Taipei to Beijing in 1979

on January 1979. The message hoped that "Taiwan returns to the embrace of the motherland at an early date so that we can work together for the great cause of national development." Zhao, S. (1999). Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing's Strategy of National Reunification with Taiwan. Pacific Affairs, 72(4), 495-512

The new policy was fully elaborated in the nine-point proposal for peaceful reunification by Ye Jianying, the vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, on 30 September 1981. Ye suggested talks between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and KMT, and specifically proposed santong (three links, i.e., commercial, postal and travel) and siliu (four exchanges, i.e., academic, cultural, economic and sports) as the first step to "gradually eliminate antagonism between the two sides and increase mutual understanding. Zhao, S. (1999).

Deng Xiaoping proposed a formula of "one country, two systems" as a viable way for reunification, Zhao, S. (1999).

To implement peaceful offence, Beijing established a semiofficial institution, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) as a counterpart to the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) on the Taiwan side, and began cross-strait functional consultations in 1992. Zhao, S. (1999).

In 1993, then Chinese premier Li Peng announced that a confrontational Taiwan policy should be replaced by one with greater emphasis on economic inducement (Wong,m 2005)
The slogan for this new policy reflects its spirit: "to peddle the [domestic] politics through business; to influence the [Taiwanese] government through the people; (Wong,m 2005)
----Li Peng, Governmental Report to the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Seventh National People's Congress , April 1993, quoted by Yun-han Chu, "The Political Economy of Taiwan's Mainland Policy," in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan , and the 1995-1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 182

Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu, chairmen of the two institutions, met in Singapore for the first time in 1993. At the meeting of the executive officials of the two institutions on 28 May 1995, the two sides decided to institutionalize the Koo-Wang talks and agreed that the second round of Koo-Wang talks would be held in Beijing on 20July of that year and the third talks in Taipei the next year. With these steps, Beijing expected to move the cross-strait relationship from the phase of discussing practical issues to the phase of political contact and negotiation and was preparing for a breakthrough in cross-strait exchanges followingJiang's eight-point proposal in 1995.Zhao, S. (1999).

Jiang Zemin (1995–2004)

the politics of power transfer from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin. 1995 was a crucial year for Jiang Zemin to complete the power succession.In the name of unity and stability, Jiang had taken on the traditional rulership style of wuweierzhi (無為而治)- a conservative tendency of immobilism

Jiang had loyally implemented the peaceful reunification policy formulated by Deng Xiaoping before 1995.

President Jiang Zemin to make the eight-point proposal for high-level negotiations to end the hostility across the strait on 30 January 1995.

Jiang's initiative was met with President Lee Teng-hui's historic visit to the United States in May 1995. More embarrassingly, Beijing's leaders received relevant forecasts only two days before the U.S. Department of State officially announced Lee's visit. Jiang Zemin and his foreign minister, Qian Qichen, were very embarrassed.

Taiwan policy can be divided into two periods. These were set apart by the “special state-to-state dispute” (liangguolun shijian) triggered by former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui in mid-1999. In the earlier period, Jiang’s policy could be characterized by harsh “verbal attacks and military threats” (wengong wuhe), while in the later period, more emphasis was placed on “great-power relations”
(daguo guanxi). These in effect applied indirect pressure by pushing the U.S. to restrain Taiwan. (Keng & Schubert, 2010)

Jiang Zemin’s Eight-Point Proposal on cross-strait relations presented in January 1995, “one China” meant: “There is only one China in the world; Taiwan is an inalienable part of China; China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be separated.” Tung, C.-y. (2005).

Jiang Zemin, the general secretary of the CCP and the president of the PRC, made an eight-point proposal on 30 January 1995. He suggested that the two sides across the Taiwan Strait start negotiations "on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides and accomplishing peaceful reunification step by step." Zhao, S. (1999)

the death of Deng Xiaoping in February 1997

in September 1997, Jiang Zemin emphatically reaffirmed his eight-point proposal for peaceful negotiations. He stressed the need "to adhere to the basic guidelines of peaceful reunification and one country, two systems," and to "entrust all the hope for the Taiwan people sharing a tradition of glorious patriotism." Jiang's eight-point proposal and to promote economic, cultural, sports, educational, technological and other exchanges with the people of Taiwan., To facilitate peaceful offence, policies and regulations concerning Taiwan would be improved and formalities for Taiwanese residents' entry to the mainland would be further simplified so that the "compatriots in Taiwan" would find it more convenient to travel, visit relatives, expand business and study on the mainland.  Zhao, S. (1999)

President Clinton personally reaffirmed the "three no's" policy in his visit to Beijing in June 1998: no support to Taiwan independence, no support to one China, one Taiwan, and no support to Taiwan's bid to join the United Nations.

After Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated on May 20 that year (2000), Beijing revised the one-China principle as follows: “There is only one China in the world; China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be separated.” On international occasions, “one China” refers to the PRC government as the sole legitimate government. Nevertheless, in dealing with cross-strait relations, “one China” does not refer to the PRC—Taiwan and the Mainland are both parts of China. This was very similar to Taipei’s definition adopted by the former Kuomintang (KMT) government in August 1992.
Up until the 2000 statement, Beijing had not accepted this wording, but after Chen Shui-bian assumed office, the new definition was accepted. Tung, C.-y. (2005).

On September 11 that year (2000) , during a media interview, the vice premier clarified the new definition of “one China”: “There is only one China in the world; both the Mainland and Taiwan belong to one China; the sovereignty and territory of China cannot be split.” Tung, C.-y. (2005).

Hu Jintao (2002 -
The official beginning of the “Hu Jintao era” was marked by the SixteenthParty Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held in October 2002. Nonetheless, it was not until after the Fourth Plenum of the CCP’s Sixteenth Central Committee in September 2004 that Hu began to assert
full control over the development of China’s policy toward Taiwan.

Hu Jintao gradually took over the levers of power from Jiang Zemin between 2002 and 2005 (Party leadership in November 2002, the military in September 2004, and the state in March 2005),

two-handed strategy (criticized by Taiwanese observers)
keep the firm hand sufficiently firm, and the soft hand sufficiently soft
the hard hand becomes harder and the soft one, softer
hard hand -- Anti-secession Law (ASL), which stipulated that any future P.R.C. government shall apply “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan if “Taiwanese independence forces…should act…to cause… Taiwan’s secession from China.”
followed soon after the promulgation of the ASL, was the launching of a series of measures to “win over the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese compatriots
soft hand--launching of a series of measures to “win over the hearts and minds of the
Taiwanese compatriots"  see Appendix 3, Lin (2008)
Lin, C.-P. (2008). More Carrot Than Stick: Beijing's Emerging Taiwan Policy. China Security, 4 (1), 29-39.

“firm hand” aspects of this policy (e.g., the 2005 Anti-Secession Law)
China has been less confident recently because Taiwan’s constitutional reforms through referendum might result in de jure independence. In particular, Beijing was shocked that Taiwan’s KMT changed its mind within a couple of days in November 2003 to support legislation for the referendum
law. As a result, in an effort to thwart movement toward de jure Taiwan independence, China’s National People’s Congress on March 14, 2005, passed theso-called Anti-Secession Law (ASL), which stated that China might use nonpeaceful means against Taiwan. Tung, C.-y. (2005).

anti-secession law China drafted based on the expectation that pro-independence parties would win a majority in Taiwan’s December 2004 legislative elections. Saunders, P. C. (2005).

Anti-Secession Law shows considerable restraint and goodwill, Wei, C. N. (2010).

It is a stick-and-carrot, military coercion, 2005. Prescrìbing the conditions for military action against Taiwan, this law was described by some people in the West and Taiwan as a war authorization law, authorization law, mainly driven by Chinese nationalism Zhao, S. (2006).

More important than the Anti-Secession Law in Hu Jintao’s approach are the “soft” initiatives to push forward cross-strait economic cooperation and integration.

The idea of an anti-secession law was initially intended as a response to Taiwan's enactment of a Referendum Law in Decem- ber 2003. It gained momentum after Chen Shui-bian won a mar- ginal reelection victory in March 2004 and announced a highly provocative zhengmin (name correction) campaign, such as changing the name of state-owned enterprises to emphasize "Taiwan" instead of "Republic of China" and inserting the name "Taiwan" in official correspondence from the foreign ministry. Beijing was very worried that the December legislative yuan election would give Chen the majority necessary to move toward amending the constitution in 2006.Zhao, S. (2006).

Hu Jintao’s Taiwan policy since he took over in 2002 is the provision of real or seemingly real economicbenefits to the Taiwanese, thereby attempting to influence public opinion and, consequently, the Taiwan government’s approach to the mainland.
Cheng-yi Lin, “The Rise of China and Taiwan’s Response: The Anti-Secession
Law as a Case Study,” Issues and Studies 43:1 (March 2007), pp. 159–88

Hu Jintao’s Taiwan policy were designed to intensify
cross-strait economic integration, or—in the DPP’s interpretation—
to increase Taiwan’s economic dependency on the mainland. It can be safely
assumed that this policy rationale has been reinforced after the KMT victory
in May 2008.

In other words, Hu’s Taiwan policy combines two key elements: on the
one hand, reducing military threats and refraining from offensive diplomacy
to minimize Taiwanese resentment; on the other, strengthening economic
interdependence to bolster China’s political leverage.

Chong-Pin Lin, “China’s New Taiwan Policy in Hu’s Era,” Zhongguo Shibao [China
Times], March 1, 2005, 0,3546,110514+112005030800328,00.html>, accessed October 1, 2008. However, the author qualified his stance later in Chong-Pin Lin, “More Carrot Than Stick,” pp. 1–27.

Tse-kang Leng, “State, Business, an Economic Interaction across the Taiwan Strait,”
Issues and Studies 1:11 (November 1995), pp. 40–58; Paul J. Bolt, “Economic Ties across the Taiwan
Strait: Buying Time for Compromise,” ibid., 37:2 (March-April 2001), pp. 80–105; Chen-yuan Tung,
“Cross-Strait Economic Relations: China’s Leverage and Taiwan’s Vulnerability,” ibid., 39:3 (September
2003), pp. 137–75; Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion against Taiwan, pp. 33–71.

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